ANTIDISCRIMINATION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT: A PARTIAL DEFENSE OF MODEL RULE
8.4(G)
Claudia E. Haupt ∗
The American Bar Association has added an antidiscrimination provision to the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, making it professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in harassment or discrimination on several bases “in conduct related to the practice of law.” But critics argue that Model Rule 8.4(g) raises serious First Amendment concerns. This Essay provides a partial defense of Model Rule 8.4(g) from a First Amendment perspective.
Using a conceptual framework of professional knowledge communities, this Essay examines
the normative justifications underlying speech protection and the corresponding extent of
permissible regulation in different contexts. So doing, it distinguishes “conduct related to the
practice of law” from public discourse. When lawyers communicate with each other in “the
practice of law,” they do not typically engage in public discourse. The regulatory efforts here
occur in the space between the professional-client relationship and public discourse. This
space is dominated by the interests of the knowledge community. Thus, outside of public discourse, the justifications underlying First Amendment protection are generally compatible
with a rule prohibiting discrimination in the practice of law. In public discourse, however, the
interests underlying speech protection prohibit an expansive interpretation of “conduct related to the practice of law.”

INTRODUCTION
The American Bar Association (ABA) at its Annual Meeting in August
2016 adopted a new addition to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules). The House of Delegates approved Model Rule 8.4(g),1
making it professional misconduct to “engage in conduct that the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual
orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law.” 2 The change received a notable amount
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of popular press coverage. 3 But critics argue that Model Rule 8.4(g) raises
serious First Amendment concerns.
This Essay offers a partial defense of Model Rule 8.4(g) from a First
Amendment perspective. The analysis lies at the undertheorized intersection of professional speech protection, regulation of the professions, and
antidiscrimination law. The professions, as I have previously suggested, are
best conceptualized as knowledge communities whose main reason for existence is the generation and dissemination of knowledge. 4 The First
Amendment should provide robust protection for professional speech—that
is, speech between a professional and a client, within a professional-client
relationship, and for the purpose of giving professional advice—against
state interference that seeks to prescribe or alter the content of professional
advice. 5 At the same time, the professions are self-regulating. 6 The power
to regulate the way in which professionals communicate with each other
and their clients in pursuit of their professional activities, I suggest, is
properly allocated to the professional knowledge community.
Applying the conceptual framework of professional knowledge communities allows us to analyze Model Rule 8.4(g) from a First Amendment
perspective that puts the role of professionals front and center. The normative justifications for First Amendment protection operate in a distinct way
within professional knowledge communities—distinct in particular from
the way in which they operate in public discourse. 7 The regulatory efforts
concerning the way in which lawyers communicate with their clients and
with each other are occurring in the space between the professional-client
relationship and public discourse, closer to the internal discourse of the
knowledge community; I argue that this space is dominated by the interests
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ance with Rule 1.16. This paragraph does not preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent
with these Rules.”
See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, Bar Association Considers Striking ‘Honeys’ From the Courtroom,
N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 4, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2aE3Wkc (discussing the effort to add a model rule
prohibiting harassment); Elizabeth Olson, Goodbye to ‘Honeys’ in Court, By Vote of American
Bar Association, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 9, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2b4oiq7 (announcing the passing of
8.4(g) by vote of the ABA); Ashley May, Lawyers, Stop Saying ‘Honey,’ ‘Sweetheart’ in Court,
USA TODAY, (Aug. 10, 2016), http://usat.ly/2bgXumW (same).
Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1241 (2016).
Id. For an example of such interference, see Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota,
South Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012) (upholding state law requiring doctors to
inform patients seeking an abortion of an increased risk of suicide to obtain informed consent).
For an example of attempted state interference that was rejected on First Amendment grounds,
see Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 2017 WL 632740 (11th Cir. Feb. 16, 2017) (holding unconstitutional as violating the First Amendment the record-keeping, inquiry, and anti-harassment
provisions of the Florida Firearms Owners’ Privacy Act).
Haupt, supra note 4, at 1277-80 & n. 205 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para.
10-11).
See id. at 1269-77 (examining professional speech and its relation to, and reliance upon, the continued integrity of the knowledge community).
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of the knowledge community. That is to say, when lawyers communicate
with each other in “the practice of law,” they do not typically engage in
public discourse. They speak as professionals in the course of professional
practice. 8 Thus, even beyond the confines of the lawyer-client relationship,
the normative justifications underlying First Amendment protection of professional speech on the one hand, and speech in public discourse on the
other hand, are generally compatible with a rule prohibiting discrimination
in the practice of law.
This Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I outlines the necessity and justifications for including an antidiscrimination provision in the Model Rules
in light of increasing diversity in the legal profession, and gives a brief
overview of past ABA and state bar activity in this area. Part II addresses
First Amendment free exercise and free speech concerns regarding the new
Model Rule. It situates these critiques within the contexts of current religion-based claims for exemptions from generally applicable antidiscrimination legislation, and of earlier discussions concerning First Amendment objections to Title VII workplace harassment law. Part III applies the
conceptual framework of professional knowledge communities to the legal
profession and provides a partial defense of Model Rule 8.4(g) from a First
Amendment perspective. I suggest that in light of the interests underlying
speech protection outside of public discourse, the First Amendment does
not generally pose an obstacle to prohibiting discrimination within the legal
profession by means of an antidiscrimination provision in the Model Rules.
But in public discourse, the interests underlying speech protection do not
justify the same limits as are permissible within the professional-client relationship. This counsels against an expansive interpretation of “conduct related to the practice of law.”
I. ABA AND STATE BAR ANTIDISCRIMINATION MEASURES
The composition of the legal profession is changing. 9 Women now
constitute nearly half of the law student population. 10 A third of the justic-
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professional practice and not merely whether the speech was uttered by a professional.”); Robert
Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician
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es on the U.S. Supreme Court are women, as are roughly 30% of judges on
the federal appellate and federal district courts.11 And yet, women and minorities are still not adequately represented 12 and the slowly shifting demographics of the legal profession all too often still meet significant obstacles. As Deborah Rhode noted, “[o]ne irony of this nation’s continuing
struggle for diversity and gender equity in employment is that the profession leading the struggle has failed to set an example in its own workplaces. In principle, the bar is deeply committed to equal opportunity and social justice. In practice, it lags behind other occupations in leveling the
playing field.” 13
In 1998, the ABA initially introduced some antidiscrimination language
in its Comments to Model Rule 8.4, but not in the Model Rules themselves. 14 Because upon adoption the comments are not designed to be
binding, 15 this was deemed insufficient. In 2008, the ABA adopted the
goal to “eliminate bias and enhance diversity.” 16
The two objectives of that goal are: “1. Promote full and equal participation in the association, our profession, and the justice system by all persons,” and, “2. Eliminate bias in the legal profession and the justice system.” 17 However, the scope of the Comment and goals was considered to
leave uncovered important areas of professional activity beyond legal representation of a client, such as “attorneys as advisors, counselors, and lobbyists,” as well as attorneys working in various settings “such as law
schools, corporate law departments, and employer-employee relationships
within law firms.” 18 Finally, the framework was not understood to “address harassment at all.” 19
By the time the ABA proposed the new Model Rule in the summer of
2016, several state bars had already adopted similar rules. In 25 jurisdic-
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http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/current_glance_statistics_may2
016.authcheckdam.pdf.
Id. at 5.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, Women and Blacks Make Little Progress at Big Law Firms, N. Y.
TIMES, (Nov. 19, 2015) http://nyti.ms/1O5EnbW (outlining the pattern of “flat to declining representation” of women and minorities in law firms).
Deborah L. Rhode, From Platitudes to Priorities: Diversity and Gender Equity in Law Firms, 24
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041 (2011).
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS, Revised Resolution 109
(Report
pp.
4-5),
available
online
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/final_re
vised_resolution_and_report_109.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter: Res. 109 Report] (discussing
the need for amendment to Model Rule 8.4, to include an antidiscrimination provision in black
letter law, not just the comments).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble & Scope para. 21.
Res. 109 Report, supra note 14, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2.
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tions, there are antidiscrimination rules, 20 and in 13 jurisdictions, there are
comments to rules similar to the previous ABA regime. 21 Only 14 states
have neither form of antidiscrimination provision. 22 Moreover, Rule 2.3(C)
of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct already contains the following
provision:
A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from
manifesting bias or prejudice, or engaging in harassment, based upon attributes
including but not limited to race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or
political affiliation, against parties, witnesses, lawyers, or others.

Against this backdrop, the ABA has now added a nondiscrimination
provision to the rules governing lawyer conduct as a floor for the states to
adopt. One prominent legal ethics scholar has stated—perhaps somewhat
optimistically—his expectation “that everyone would stipulate that such a
rule’s objective is sound and probably long overdue,” before also noting
“that deciding how to articulate such a standard is harder than it looks.” 23
The remainder of this Essay will evaluate the newly adopted Model Rule
from a First Amendment perspective.
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Id. at 5 (citing California Rule of Prof’l Conduct 2-400; Colorado Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(g);
Florida Rule of Prof’l Conduct 4-8.4(d); Idaho Rule of Prof’l Conduct 4.4(a); Illinois Rule of
Prof’l Conduct 8.4(j); Indiana Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(g); Iowa Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(g);
Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(e); Massachusetts Rule of Prof’l Conduct 3.4(i);
Michigan Rule of Prof’l Conduct 6.5; Minnesota Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(h); Missouri Rule of
Prof’l Conduct 4-8.4(g); Nebraska Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(d); New Jersey Rule of Prof’l
Conduct 8.4(g); New Mexico Rule of Prof’l Conduct 16-300; New York Rule of Prof’l Conduct
8.4(g); North Dakota Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(f); Ohio Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(g); Oregon
Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(a)(7); Rhode Island Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(d); Texas Rule of
Prof’l Conduct 5.08; Vermont Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(g); Washington Rule of Prof’l Conduct
8.4(g); Wisconsin Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4(i); D.C. Rule of Prof’l Conduct 9.1.).
Id. at 6 n. 12 (citing Arizona Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt.; Arkansas Rule of Prof’l Conduct
8.4, cmt. [3]; Connecticut Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, Commentary; Delaware Lawyers’ Rule of
Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt. [3]; Idaho Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt. [3]; Maine Rule of Prof’l
Conduct 8.4, cmt. [3]; North Carolina Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt. [5]; South Carolina Rule
of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt. [3]; South Dakota Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt. [3]; Tennessee
Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt. [3]; Utah Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt. [3]; Wyoming Rule
of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt. [3]; West Virginia Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.4, cmt. [3].).
Id. at 6 n. 13 (“The states that do not address this issue in their rules include Alabama, Alaska,
Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.).
Thomas D. Morgan, The Challenge of Writing Rules to Regulate Lawyer Conduct, 49
CREIGHTON L. REV. 807, 821 (2016).
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS
The First Amendment has arguably acquired a deregulatory character. 24
Its deregulatory thrust in this context is employed against a rule established
by a self-regulating profession for members of the profession, governing
their own communications with their clients and other professionals in the
exercise of their profession. Scholars and practitioners have raised First
Amendment objections to Model Rule 8.4(g) that to a significant extent
track arguments articulated in favor of religious exemptions from general
antidiscrimination laws, and those articulated against Title VII workplace
harassment law. This Part presents and contextualizes those objections in
turn.
A. Freedom of Religion
Within parts of the legal profession, recent developments—in particular, the advent of marriage equality 25—have led to some anxiety. One
commentator has concluded that professional rules could force divorce attorneys to handle same-sex divorces over their religious objections and argued for accommodation of these professionals. 26 The argument hinges on
legal services being a form of public accommodation. 27 If legal services
are in fact public accommodations, the argument goes, lawyers—like wedding photographers, 28 cake bakers, 29 and florists 30—may be compelled to
render their services despite their religious objections. 31 It is in this larger
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See, e.g., Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV.
FORUM 165 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WISC. L. REV. 133; Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015).
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that the right to marry is fundamental).
Bill Piatt, Opting Out in the Name of God: Will Lawyers Be Compelled to Handle Same-Sex
Divorces?, 79 ALB. L. REV. 683 (2016).
Id. at 697 (arguing that although there are “no cases which directly hold that legal services are a
form of public accommodations” such a finding is likely in light of the treatment of other professions and a trend of “inclusion . . . of businesses under those statutes.”).
Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014)
(holding that a company refusing to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony discriminated
on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act).
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. petition pending
(holding that a cake shop owner’s refusal to create a same-sex couple’s wedding cake violated
the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act).
State v. Arlene Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00871-5, 2015 WL 94248 (Wash. Super. Jan. 7, 2015)
(holding that the defendant must provide full wedding support for same-sex ceremonies regardless of personal beliefs).
See Piatt, supra note 26, at 685; see also Ronald D. Rotunda, The ABA Decision to Control What
Lawyers Say: Supporting “Diversity” But Not Diversity of Thought, Heritage Foundation Legal
Memorandum
No.
191,
Oct.
6,
2016,
at
5,
available
at
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/10/the-aba-decision-to-control-what-lawyers-saysupporting-diversity-but-not-diversity-of-thought (“The existence of Rule 8.4(g) makes it easier
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context that First Amendment objections are raised against general antidiscrimination legislation. 32 And, importantly, Comment 3 to Model Rule 8.4
refers to substantive antidiscrimination law as providing guidance in the
application of Model Rule 8.4(g).
Representative of the religious freedom objections to Model Rule
8.4(g), the Christian Legal Society 33 and the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops 34 raised numerous concerns in their comments on the
draft of the proposed Model Rule. They can be roughly divided into intraorganizational concerns, that is, the relationship of the individual professional to the organization (in this case, the religious organization) into
which he is embedded; and inter-professional concerns, that is, the relationship of one professional to another, outside of the organizational structure.
Intra-organizational concerns, which can affect many professionals, 35
raise a fundamental question: is the professional within a religious organization primarily bound by the rules of the profession or by religious doctrine? The objection here is to interference by the professional rules with
the inner workings of the organization. A conflict can potentially pit the
religious identity of the organization against the professional identity of the
employee. 36 Objections to the Model Rule in this category include: allowing continued preference for coreligionists in hiring; providing advice on
religion-based employee conduct standards; and allowing the organizational employer to enforce religion-based standards with respect to grooming
and garb as well as bathroom and locker room access. 37
A related set of concerns goes to the role of lawyers as members of religious organizations, where they may serve on “boards of their churches,
religious schools and colleges, and other religious non-profits.” 38 These
organizations “regularly turn to the lawyers serving as volunteers on their

32
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38

for a state court to find that refusing to represent a client or refusing to draft certain papers for a
client violates that state’s general antidiscrimination laws.”).
See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205 (2014).
Letter of Christian Legal Society to ABA Ethics Committee, (March 10, 2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/aba_mo
del_rule%208_4_comments/nammo_3_10_16.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter: CLS Letter].
Letter of United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Office of the General Counsel, to ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, (March 10, 2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/aba_mo
del_rule%208_4_comments/moses_3_11_16.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter: USCCB Letter].
See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ___, 11-16 (forthcoming 2017) draft available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2827762 (discussing various institutional
settings in which professionals operate).
Cf. Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1502 (2012) (discussing religious hospitals).
USCCB Letter, supra note 34.
CLS Letter, supra note 33, at 7.
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boards for pro bono guidance.” 39 Here, too, the concern is that the new antidiscrimination Model Rule will result in disciplinary actions against professionals serving in such capacities.
With respect to the inter-professional as well as lawyer-client relationships, the USCCB and CLS letters emphasize that lawyers should be able
to decline representation. This is already regulated in Model Rule 1.16,
and the final version of Model Rule 8.4(g) clarifies that “[t]his paragraph
does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a
representation in accordance with Rule 1.16.” With respect to general antidiscrimination legislation, the USCCB letter states that taking particular religion-based positions in advocacy (i.e., representing the cake baker or declining to draft a prenup for a same-sex couple) is problematic unless the
new Model Rule clarifies that doing so is not professional misconduct.
Here, too, the final version of the Model Rule states that it “does not preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.”
B. Freedom of Speech
Critics of Model Rule 8.4(g) also raised a range of free speech concerns. Ronald Rotunda, for example, contends that, with the new Model
Rule, “the [ABA] decides to discipline lawyers who say something that is
politically incorrect.” 40 Similarly, Eugene Volokh articulates some of the
key First Amendment-based critiques. He asserts that the ABA has created
a “lawyer speech code,” and questions in particular the inclusion of discrimination based on socioeconomic status. 41
The “lawyer speech code”-critique encompasses viewpoint discrimination and overbreadth concerns. Volokh suggests that a lawyer who articulates anti-marriage equality views, or argues in favor of “limits on immigration from Muslim countries,” or who doubts “whether people should be
allowed to use the bathrooms that correspond to their gender identity rather
than their biological sex” in the context of a debate at a CLE event could be
disciplined by the state bar if the new Model Rule were adopted. 42 He as39
40
41

42

Id.
Rotunda, supra note 31, at 2.
Eugene Volokh, A speech code for lawyers, banning viewpoints that express ‘bias,’ including in
law-related social activities, The Volokh Conspiracy, WASHINGTON POST, (Aug. 10, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/10/a-speech-code-forlawyers-banning-viewpoints-that-express-bias-including-in-law-related-social-activities2/?utm_term=.3431edcfba91 [hereinafter: Volokh, Speech Code]; Eugene Volokh, Banning lawyers from discriminating based on ‘socioeconomic status’ in choosing partners, employees or
POST,
(Aug.
10,
2016),
experts,
The
Volokh
Conspiracy,
WASHINGTON
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/10/banning-lawyersfrom-discriminating-based-on-socioeconomic-status-in-choosing-partners-employees-or-experts2/?utm_term=.0964096f87dd [hereinafter: Volokh, Socioeconomic Status].
Volokh, Speech Code, supra note 41.
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serts “that the ABA wants to . . . limit lawyers’ expression of viewpoints
that it disapproves of.” 43 Similarly, Rotunda claims, “The ABA rule is not
about forbidding discrimination based on sex or marital status; it is about
punishing those who say or do things that do not support the ABA’s particular view of sex discrimination or marriage.” 44
With respect to overbreadth, Volokh notes that the new Model Rule
“goes beyond existing hostile-work-environment harassment law under Title VII and similar state statutes,” which, he points out, “in most
states . . . doesn’t include sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status
or socioeconomic status.” 45 He concludes that “there’s no reason for state
bars or state courts to go beyond the existing state and federal antidiscrimination categories when it comes to employment and similar matters.” 46
Finally, he criticizes the vagueness of the provision with respect to “socioeconomic status,” a term not defined in the Model Rule or Comments.
Activities that “might well lead to discipline” in his assessment include:
“A law firm preferring more-educated employees . . . over less-educated
ones,” or preferring those “who went to high-’status’ institutions, such as
Ivy League schools.” Similarly, disciplinary action may loom when choosing a partner for the firm, “preferring a wealthier would-be partner over a
poorer one.” Beyond the firm’s employees, the provision may lead to disciplinary action for “contracting with expert witnesses and expert consultants who are especially well-educated or have had especially prestigious
employment.” 47
* * *
These free speech clause-based critiques reflect and invoke arguments
made in earlier debates surrounding First Amendment objections to Title
VII workplace harassment law. This is particularly relevant because
Comment 3 to Model Rule 8.4 states that “[t]he substantive law of antidiscrimination and anti-harassment statutes and case law may guide application of paragraph (g).” It is therefore useful briefly to contextualize these

43
44
45

46
47

Id.
Rotunda, supra note 31, at 7.
Volokh, Speech Code; see also Rotunda, supra note 31, at 6 (“Many states have no law banning
gender identification [sic] discrimination. Some states require that individuals use public restrooms that correspond to the sex on their birth certificates. Congress has not enacted a statute
banning discrimination based on gender identification.”).
Volokh, Socioeconomic Status, supra note 41.
Id.
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arguments by revisiting, in Richard Fallon’s words, “the First Amendment
dog that didn’t bark.” 48
Fallon noted that the absence of a First Amendment discussion in the
landmark workplace harassment decision Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 49
may “implicitly acknowledge[] that distinctive principles should apply to
sexually harassing speech in the workplace.” 50 After Harris, he concluded,
“it is highly unlikely that workplace expressions of gender-based hostility
and communications of explicitly sexual messages will receive categorical
protection.” 51 The upshot of that larger debate is that, some assertions to
the contrary notwithstanding, 52 Title VII workplace harassment law is generally not considered to violate the First Amendment. Volokh, however,
expressed some skepticism and cautioned that, in his assessment, at least
some areas of workplace harassment law may be susceptible to First
Amendment challenge. 53 Thus, he suggested that “the Court ought to create a new First Amendment exception that would allow much of harassment law to stand.” 54
Jack Balkin identified three categories of arguments critics have made
to assert “more radical First Amendment objections” to harassment law:
“First, the courts’ standard of abusive conduct is unduly vague. Second,
sexual harassment doctrines are overbroad because they prohibit speech
that would clearly be protected outside the workplace. Third, sexual harassment doctrines make distinctions on the basis of content and viewpoint.” 55 Using the framework of captive audience doctrine, Balkin concluded that “none of these objections prove fatal.” 56 The vagueness
objection, he asserted, “applies equally to most judge-made communications torts”, while the overbreadth objection fails because different First
Amendment protection attaches to speech in different contexts: “Often
speech that would be protected in the public square becomes unprotected

48
49
50
51
52

53

54
55
56

Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog
That Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 56.
510 U.S. 17 (1993) (defining hostile work environment under Title VII to include all circumstances with psychological harm not being a requirement for finding an abusive environment).
Fallon, supra note 48, at 2.
Id. at 9.
See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and
the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L. J. 481 (1991) (arguing that workplace harassment law is
generally unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992)
(arguing that some forms of workplace harassment law may be unconstitutional as a First
Amendment matter and introducing a directed/undirected speech framework to distinguish the
two).
Id. at 1819.
Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2306-07
(1999).
Id. at 2307.
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when it occurs in special social situations involving special social roles.” 57
And finally, the content and viewpoint discrimination objection fails because of the very reason that workplace harassment law exists in the first
place: “Title VII appropriately protects workers from a limited class of status-based harms because protecting workers from these harms is essential
to guaranteeing equality in the workplace.” 58 But these conclusions only
follow if the interests underlying employment discrimination law are fully
considered in context. 59 Likewise, Fallon endorsed the captive audience
argument in the context of the workplace. 60 Drawing on Robert Post’s theory of public discourse, he, too, emphasized different spheres of First
Amendment activity. 61
But, as the next Part will show, the interests underlying workplace harassment law do not always map onto the interests underlying Model Rule
8.4(g). Therefore, it is useful to untangle the two, and interrogate how First
Amendment speech protection operates in relation to the new Model Rule.
Doing so also sheds light on the extent to which drawing on substantive antidiscrimination law for guidance, as Comment 3 expressly permits, will be
useful. Accordingly, the underlying justifications for speech protection
must be evaluated in a context-specific manner.
III. REGULATING A PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE COMMUNITY
Taking the concept of the professions as knowledge communities as a
starting point, this Part provides a partial defense of Model Rule 8.4(g)
against some of the First Amendment concerns just outlined. Conceptualizing the professions as knowledge communities emphasizes their
knowledge-based character. 62 I have argued that “members of knowledge
communities have shared notions of validity and a common way of knowing and reasoning (consider the old adage of thinking like a lawyer).” 63 In
addition to their shared knowledge basis, “the knowledge community
shares certain norms and values: professional norms. This is not to say
that knowledge communities are monolithic. But their shared notions of
validity limit the range of acceptable opinions found within them.” 64 This
57
58

59
60
61

62
63
64

Id.
Id. at 2318 (“Thus, it makes perfect sense that a sign saying ‘Sarah is Employee of the Month’
should not give rise to liability, while a sign reading ‘Sarah is a dumb-ass woman’ could form
part of a hostile environment case.”).
Id. at 2307-08.
Fallon, supra note 48, at 43.
Id. at 48 (“As Robert Post has argued, political democracy requires a broad space for unrestricted
‘public discourse,’ but that space need not be boundless. Not all contexts are equal from the perspective of the First Amendment.”).
Haupt, supra note 4, at 1249.
Id. at 1251.
Id.
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Part first explores the basis of professional advice before considering its
scope.
This Part then turns to the extent of permissible regulation of the profession. The rules for professional communication in the legal profession
can take various forms, including the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, among others: 65 “Lawyers’ freedom of speech is constrained in many
ways that no one would challenge seriously under the First Amendment.” 66
As Kathleen Sullivan has observed: “Rules of evidence and procedure,
bans on revealing grand jury testimony, page limits in briefs, and sanctions
for frivolous pleadings, to name a few, are examples of speech limitations
that are widely accepted as functional necessities in the administration of
justice.” 67
It is important to distinguish the various contexts in which lawyers typically operate, because each context may have a different set of implications
regarding the normative basis of First Amendment protection. The respective justifications for speech protection determine whether regulation is
permissible at all and, if so, how it ought to be configured. Thus, in order
to determine whether the antidiscrimination Model Rule is compatible with
the First Amendment in each context, it is important first to fully understand the interests at stake. And because these interests may be different
from the interests underlying workplace harassment and other forms of
substantive antidiscrimination law, those areas, notwithstanding Comment
3, may only provide limited guidance.
A. The Basis of Professional Advice
Conceptualizing the professions as knowledge communities provides a
framework to assess the basis upon which professional advice may be rendered. This informs the treatment of religious freedom concerns. Personal
beliefs—religious, political, or philosophical—can be either those of the
professional or those of the client. As I have argued more extensively
elsewhere, professionals who base their advice on exogenous justifications
place themselves outside of the knowledge community. 68 The knowledge

65

66
67
68

Cf. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991) (“It is unquestionable that in the
courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is
extremely circumscribed.”).
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints on
Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 569 (1998).
Id.
Claudia E. Haupt, Religious Outliers: Professional Knowledge Communities, Individual Conscience Claims, and the Availability of Professional Services to the Public, in LAW, RELIGION,
AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES (Holly Fernandez Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen & Elizabeth Sepper eds. forthcoming 2017) (draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2809832).
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community can appropriately circumscribe departures from professional
knowledge to accommodate the professional’s personal beliefs. 69
The basis upon which valid legal arguments are made is limited to arguments based on professional knowledge and shared ways of knowing and
reasoning. A legal realist might instinctively protest; yet, even the legal realist likely will concede that there is a difference between these two statements: (a) your client is engaging in sinful behavior by doing X and needs
to stop because a higher power says so, and (b) your client is seeking my
client’s assistance in doing something the law recognizes as a burden on
my client’s religious freedom. The first is not a legally cognizable claim.
It is not based on the accepted methodology of the knowledge community,
that is, in this case, legal doctrine. The second is a legally cognizable claim
for a religious exemption on statutory or constitutional grounds. It is based
in legal doctrine, and thus based on the shared methodology of the
knowledge community. (Whether it will ultimately be a successful claim
on the merits, however, is another matter.) This is consistent with sentence
3 of Model Rule 8.4(g) : “This paragraph does not preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.” The terms “advice” and
“advocacy” presuppose a basis in legal doctrine, that is, the shared methodology of the profession, rather than exogenous factors such as the religious,
political, or philosophical beliefs of the professional.
A critic might object that this privileges professional identity over religious identity. As the CLS letter explains, “Christians are enjoined by
Scripture to bring their religious beliefs and practices to bear in their professions – indeed, to see their professions as their ministries of service to
others – and to apply their Christian principles to the practice of their professions.” 70 Indeed, a professional may be deeply motivated by her religious beliefs to practice her profession. Nevertheless, under a theory that
conceptualizes the professions as knowledge communities, the justification
for professional advice—irrespective of the professional’s motivation—
ought to be based on the shared knowledge and methods of the profession.
Within the lawyer-client relationship, correspondingly, the client’s expectation will be that legal advice will be rendered based on the insights of the
legal profession. 71

69

70
71

See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Ethics, Personal Conscience, and Public Expectations,
27 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 233 (2016) (commentary on American Medical Association Opinion
1.1.7, Physician Exercise of Conscience).
CLS letter, supra note 33, at 10.
See Haupt, supra note 35, at 22-25 (distinguishing motivations and justifications).

14

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:

B. The Range of Professional Advice
Turning to the range of professional advice, the conceptual framework
of the professions as knowledge communities likewise limits what may be
rendered as valid legal advice. And, indeed, the range of good professional
advice is equally limited by the tort regime which imposes professional
malpractice liability for bad advice.72
Professional knowledge, moreover, evolves in the legal profession as it
does in other professions. What once was good professional advice may
become outdated. 73 If we think about legal doctrine as the profession’s
shared methodology, there are doctrinal arguments that once were accepted
but no longer are. Put in the language of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, what once cleared the Rule 12(b)(6) bar may no longer clear the Rule
11 bar. (And it is unlikely that the First Amendment provides a defense
against Rule 11 sanctions. 74)
My claim here is not one of “political correctness,” as illustrated for example by Rotunda’s contention that “[a] few years ago, it was politically
incorrect to support gay marriage; now it is politically incorrect to oppose
gay marriage.” 75 Rather, it is one that concerns changes in legal doctrine
over time. There are cases that, if brought now, would play out much differently than they might have just a half-decade (or less) ago. For example,
a lower court deciding whether a surviving same-sex spouse is entitled to
the federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses will now come to a
different conclusion than what might have been doctrinally defensible in
the past. 76
Quite apart from that, it may be problematic that major law firms are
weary of representing clients with unpopular views. 77 This is the type of
scenario envisioned by Model Rule 1.2(b), which states: “A lawyer’s representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not
constitute an endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral views or activities.” This is also reiterated in Comment 5 to Model Rule
8.4. But an unpopular view may still be based on good law, and there may
be a non-frivolous argument based in legal doctrine to be made to support
it. 78
72
73
74
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76
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See id. at 4.
See id. at 7.
See Sullivan, supra note 66, at 569.
Rotunda, supra note 31, at 7.
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
Adam Liptak, The Case Against Gay Marriage: Law Firms Won’t Touch It, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr.
11, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1z71R5k.
Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so
that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”).
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C. (Partially) Reconciling Speech Protection and the Antidiscrimination
Model Rule
What, then, are the First Amendment interests at stake, and how do they
interact with Model Rule 8.4(g)? Answering this question requires an examination of the different contexts in which lawyers communicate. Comment 4 states: “Conduct related to the practice of law includes representing
clients; interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers and
others while engaged in the practice of law; operating or managing a law
firm or law practice; and participating in bar association, business or social
activities in connection with the practice of law.” The following discussion
breaks down the prototypical contexts into, first, the lawyer-client relationship where the lawyer acts as the client’s advisor; second, the lawyer as advocate in the courtroom, in negotiations with another lawyer, or as advocate or lobbyist outside the courtroom, interacting with other lawyers; and,
third, the lawyer in public discourse.
1. Professional-Client Relationship
When considering the lawyer-client relationship, two constellations
have to be distinguished: formation of the lawyer-client relationship, and
professional advice-giving within the lawyer-client relationship. The underlying interests diverge at these two distinct points in time, with implications for speech protection and the extent of permissible regulation.
At the formation stage, the Model Rules provide that the lawyer may
generally refuse representation, as is recognized in Model Rule 1.16 and
reiterated in the second sentence of Model Rule 8.4(g). Prohibiting discrimination at the formation stage potentially puts the lawyer’s interests in
tension with the client’s. This tension is usually resolved once the lawyerclient relationship has been formed. (Of course, potential conflicts can
arise again during the course of the representation, and Model Rule 1.16
also provides for that scenario.)
Once formed, for purposes of this discussion, the client’s and the lawyer’s interests align. The lawyer-client relationship gives rise to fiduciary
duties; the lawyer has to act in the client’s best interest. The client’s key
interest lies in proper representation. That the lawyer serves this client interest is also ensured by the imposition of professional malpractice liability. 79 The fundamental concern here, however, is that the advice-giving attorney will refrain from advising the client in a way that would subject her
to sanctions for violating Model Rule 8.4(g). For example, the client wants

79

See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1286-87 (conceptualizing First Amendment protection for professional speech as coextensive with professional malpractice liability).
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to make an anti-marriage equality argument and the lawyer is concerned
she will be sanctioned for doing so.
What if the Model Rule prohibits the lawyer from properly representing
the client? This seems to be at the heart of the religious freedom objections
to the Model Rule. Within the lawyer-client relationship, the First
Amendment should provide robust protection against state interference.
Yet, the interests underlying professional advice-giving are constrained by
the duty to give good professional advice. 80 In the context of giving legal
advice, that means advice based on legal doctrine. And so the third sentence of Model Rule 8.4(g) states that it “does not preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.” Moreover, the ABA Report
explicitly states that the new Model Rule “does not limit the scope of the
legal advice a lawyer may render to clients.” 81 And “legal advice” means
advice based on the insights of the knowledge community. All of this is
generally consistent with a provision prohibiting discrimination in the practice of law. So understood, the antidiscrimination provision does not proscribe offering doctrinally defensible arguments, even if those arguments
might be colloquially described as “discriminatory.”
2. Professional-Professional Communications Related to the Practice
of Law
The potential target of discrimination in this context is opposing counsel in the courtroom or other lawyers the professional encounters in the
practice of law. Here, it is again useful to divide the concerns into interprofessional concerns and intra-organizational ones.
The category of inter-professional concerns that has received the most
attention in the press is that of courtroom interactions. 82 Regulation of
these interactions seems to be relatively uncontroversial; even critics of the
new Model Rule agree that “State bars and state courts may reasonably impose special rules on behavior in court, behavior with respect to witnesses,
and the like.” 83
Another set of concerns raised by critics concerns CLE panels on controversial issues. Recall the program envisioned by Volokh “that included
a debate on same-sex marriage, or on whether there should be limits on
immigration from Muslim countries, or on whether people should be allowed to use the bathrooms that correspond to their gender identity rather
than their biological sex. In the process, unsurprisingly, the debater on one
side said something that was critical of gays, Muslims or transgender peo80
81
82
83

See Haupt, supra note 35, at 3-4.
Res. 109 Report, supra note 14, at 8.
See supra note 3.
Volokh, Socioeconomic Status, supra note 41.
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ple.” 84 In his assessment, under the new Model Rule, “the debater could
well be disciplined by the state bar.” 85 Likewise, Rotunda is concerned
about religious organizations, such as the St. Thomas More Society, as
sponsors of CLE programs. 86
The interests at stake are guided by the purpose of such panels. Unlike
general political debates, CLE programs are designed to ensure that lawyers “maintain the requisite knowledge and skill” to serve their clients
competently. 87 They are designed to ensure that lawyers base their professional advice on the methodological basis of their knowledge community:
“Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” 88 Their
primary purpose is not, however, for an individual lawyer to speak his own
mind, which would be a key autonomy interest in public discourse. 89
So suppose the debaters at a CLE panel articulated the arguments expressed in the Chief Justice’s dissent in Obergefell, 90 or in Justice Alito’s
dissent from denial of certiorari in Stormans v. Wiesman, a case concerning
the Washington law requiring pharmacies to stock medications some pharmacists consider abortifacients, 91 or Judge Niemeyer’s partial concurrence
and dissent in G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board, a case concerning
transgender bathroom access. 92 These arguments would be squarely based
on legal doctrine. The range of competent professional advice is limited by
the requirement of basing advice on a shared methodology—that is, legal
doctrine—and making non-frivolous arguments. Within the framework of
the professions as knowledge communities, the CLE scenario is not a hard
case.
Intra-organizational concerns will likely be those within the lawyer’s
firm. Here, workplace harassment law is most salient. Communication
within the firm or the workplace indeed will continue to be governed by
applicable workplace harassment law. 93 “If state law bans, say, sexual orientation discrimination in employment generally, that would normally ap84
85
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See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
Volokh, Speech Code, supra note 411.
Rotunda, supra note 31, at 4-5.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (“To maintain the requisite knowledge and
skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits
and risks associated with relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and
comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.”).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1.
Cf. Haupt, supra note 4, at 1272—73 (distinguishing professional autonomy interests in the professional speech context from autonomy interests in public discourse).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
136 S. Ct. 2433 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
822 F.3d 709, 730 (4th Cir. 2016) (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See generally Alex B. Long, Employment Discrimination in the Legal Profession: A Question of
Ethics?, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 445.

18

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:

ply to law firms as well as to other firms.” 94 The ABA Report, accordingly, notes that Model Rule 8.4(g) “is not intended to replace employment
discrimination law.” 95
The question, however, is whether the Model Rule can go beyond the
categories recognized in applicable federal or state antidiscrimination law.
The critics say no. 96 With respect to new categories, “there’s no reason for
state bars or state courts to go beyond the existing state and federal antidiscrimination categories when it comes to employment and similar matters.” 97
But in a self-regulating profession, 98 the interests cut exactly the other
way. If the power to regulate the profession is properly allocated to the
profession itself, there is no reason to tether the categories of prohibited
discrimination to the state. This is especially true in the areas of sexual orientation and gender identity where antidiscrimination legislation is lacking
in most states, 99 but the ABA has long ago adopted “policies promoting the
equal treatment of all persons regardless of sexual orientation or gender
identity.” 100
Consider also that municipalities do the same in going beyond the state
in antidiscrimination law. (This, of course, has caused some states to
preempt local activities, such as most recently H.B. 2 in North Carolina
where a Charlotte ordinance that included discrimination based on gender
identity was preempted by the state. 101) If a city—on the standard justifications of being closer to those affected and more directly accountable—may
go beyond the state in expanding protection, it is not obvious why the state
bar should not be able to do so, on even stronger theoretical footing, with
respect to a self-regulating profession.
The “socioeconomic status” category appears to be the least commonly
adopted elsewhere.102 As mentioned earlier, it appears in Rule 2.3 (C) of
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 103 The ABA Report cites a disciplinary case in which “a lawyer was reprimanded for disparaging references
94
95
96
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Volokh, Socioeconomic Status, supra note 41.
Res. 109 Report, supra note 14, at 11.
Volokh, Socioeconomic Status, supra note 41 (stating that state bars and courts shouldn’t overstep state and federal categories); Rotunda, supra note 31, at 6 (discussing that the rule applies
even without state or federal law bans).
Volokh, Socioeconomic Status, supra note 41.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 10-11.
Non-Discrimination
Laws:
State
by
State
Information—Map,
ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/map/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map (last visited Mar.
18, 2017, 6:24 PM).
Res. 109 Report, supra note 14, at 12.
Act of March 23, 2016, 2016 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. (LexisNexis).
Volokh, Socioeconomic Status, supra note 41 (“To my knowledge, no state anti-discrimination
law prohibits such discrimination.”).
See supra Part I.
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he made at trial about a litigant’s socioeconomic status” as providing guidance. 104 Volokh notes that courts have defined the term as it is used in the
Sentencing Guidelines as “an individual’s status in society as determined
by objective criteria such as education, income, and employment.” 105
Moreover, commentators have previously suggested introducing this category into the legal ethics rules. 106 Ultimately, the question is not whether
adding a new category is impermissible; it is whether the profession considers doing so wise. It will generally be possible for courts to adjudicate
claims based on a (more or less) new category. But, by the same reasoning
which applied to sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination, it
should be up to the profession to decide which categories to include beyond
the ones recognized by state or federal antidiscrimination law.
3. Social Interactions and Public Discourse
The final, and most problematic, area covered by the Model Rule concerns social interactions of lawyers. Comment 4 identifies “participating in
bar association, business, or social activities in connection with the practice
of law.” 107 The ABA Report describes lawyers as “public citizens” 108 who
are bound by the disciplinary rules when participating in such activities.
These include “law firm dinners and other nominally social events at which
lawyers are present solely because of their association with their law firm
or in connection with their practice of law.” 109 From a First Amendment
perspective, this is thorny. The ABA Report is cognizant of the problem,
stating that “[t]he proposed rule is constitutionally limited; it does not seek
to regulate harassment or discrimination by a lawyer that occurs outside the
scope of the lawyer’s practice of law.” 110 The Report contends that “[t]he
nexus of the conduct regulated by the rule is that it is conduct lawyers are
permitted or required to engage in because of their work as a lawyer.”111
But despite these attempts to clarify, the boundary between “social activities” and public discourse remains fuzzy.
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Res. 109 Report, supra note 14, at 13 (citing In re Campiti, 937 N.E.2d 340 (2009)).
Volokh, Socioeconomic Status, supra note 41 (citing United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 393,
n.14 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Graham, 946 F.2d 19, 21 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting Untied
States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
See, e.g., Eli Wald, A Primer on Diversity, Discrimination, and Equality in the Legal Profession
or Who is Responsible for Pursuing Diversity and Why, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1079, 1113-16
(2011) (noting that Model Rule 8.4 does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of, inter alia,
socioeconomic status and calling for its revision based on state models).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 4.
Res. 109 Report, supra note 14, at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
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Whereas professionals are bound to communicate the knowledge community’s insights within the professional-client relationship, they are free
to challenge those insights in public discourse. 112 The line here is the presence or absence of a professional-client relationship. 113 And while the underlying interests may permit regulation of a professional’s speech in the
practice of their profession, those interests are likely absent in public discourse. As Robert Post noted,
There are circumstances in which speech ought to be regulated according to
principles quite distinct from those that underlie public discourse. To offer only
an obvious example, speech that is appropriately protected when it occurs within public discourse is also appropriately regulated as racial or sexual harassment when it occurs within the context of an employment relationship. This is
true because there are good reasons for the law to regard persons as autonomous within the context of political deliberation, but there are equally good
reasons for the law to regard persons as dependent within the workplace. 114

Imagine a lawyer attending a bar dinner reiterating, and agreeing with,
the then-GOP presidential nominee’s view that judges of Mexican heritage
are unable to serve impartially in cases involving the nominee’s business
ventures. This is core political speech; moreover, assessing the fairness of
the judicial process is at the core of discussions among members of the legal profession. But whereas the professional speaker is constrained by the
standards of the profession in the context of the professional-client relationship, such constraints are absent in public discourse. To take only the
professional’s autonomy interests as an example, in the professional context, “the professional speaker has a unique autonomy interest in communicating her message according to the standards of the profession to which
she belongs;” the interest of the individual professional in public discourse
is to speak her own mind. 115 Thus, from a First Amendment perspective,
regulation at this point is on constitutionally weak footing.
CONCLUSION
A contextual analysis that untangles the distinctive interests underlying
workplace discrimination, general antidiscrimination legislation, and the
interests of the legal profession in ending discrimination in the practice of
law allows a more nuanced assessment of whether, and to what extent,
Model Rule 8.4(g) is compatible with the First Amendment. Considering
these interests also reveals that guidance of general antidiscrimination law
pursuant to Comment 3 is likely limited.
112
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See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1255-57.
Id. at 1254-55.
Robert C. Post, The Perils of Conceptualism: A Response to Professor Fallon, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1744, 1746 (1990).
See Haupt, supra note 4, at 1272-73.

Apr. 2017]

ANTIDISCRIMINATION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION

21

The narrow, but important, insight this analysis offers is that, conceptually, the First Amendment is not a roadblock to regulation of professionals’
speech by the profession via an antidiscrimination provision. At the same
time, “conduct related to the practice of law” must be more clearly distinguished from public discourse. One prominent scholar of the legal profession predicted with respect to Model Rule 8.4(g) that “whatever proposal is
actually adopted likely will be further amended.” 116 From a First Amendment perspective, outside of public discourse, no principled objection to the
antidiscrimination provision emerges. Within public discourse, however,
the interests underlying speech protection counsel against an expansive interpretation of “conduct related to the practice of law.”
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Morgan, supra note 233, at 823.

